

Security for Real-Time Military Systems Open Systems Project Engineering Conference (OSPEC) FY 98 Status Review 29 April - 1 May 1998

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Project Number 40 Overview Agenda





- Participants and Standards Bodies
- Purpose and Goals
- FY97 Tasks
- Background and Objective of the "Delta Document Security Addendum"
- What Are the Threats Out There
- Partitioning the Security Requirements
- A Look at the Requirements
- "Delta Document Security Addendum" Summary
- FY98 Summary



Participants and Standards Bodies



• Key Participants:

- DISA / JIEO CFS
- SPAWARSYSCEN San Diego (formerly NRaD)
- Lloyd LaMont Design
- Raytheon Systems Company (formerly Hughes Electronics)

Standards Bodies:

- IEEE Portable Application Standards Committee (PASC)
- The Open Group
- Object Management Group (OMG)
- W3C (WWW Consortium)

Purpose



- Fill the Existing Void for Advanced Systems.
- Define a Standard Interface and Environment for Computer Operating Systems that require:
 - (1) Security Mechanisms and/or
 - (2) A Secure Environment
- Define a Framework for Security within Distributed Open Systems.
- Identify the Required Security Service Primitives of the Framework.

Goals



- Keep the Industry Momentum Going, Govt Participation.
- Support, Advance and Complete the Development of POSIX Security Drafts:
 - P1003.1e -- Protection, Audit and Control Interfaces. (Sited in v2 of the JTA)
 - P1003.2c -- Protection and Control Utilities.
 - P1003.22 -- Security Framework / Guide for POSIX Open System Environment. (Sited in Version 2 of the JTA) [The Open Group]
- Foster Acceptance of Real-Time Security Requirements Within The DoD and Standards Communities:
 - IEEE PASC, The Open Group
 - International Organization of Standardization (ISO)
 - Major DoD Organizations, Offices and Programs.



FY97 Tasks



- Survey the Draft POSIX Security Standards, and Real-Time Weapon Systems / Avionics Systems Security Requirements.
- Identify Security Services not Present in POSIX, but Critical to Military and Industrial Real-Time Partmers.
- Generate a "Delta Document Security Addendum" for Embedded Real-Time Military Systems.
- Promote Real-Time Embedded Security Within IEEE PASC:
 - Participate in Current Security Working Group Activities.
 - Pursue the Creation of a POSIX Study Group to Address System Security Issues.



Background on the "Delta Document Security Addendum"





- Delta Document was completed and Delivered in October 1996.
- A Statement of Work for Delta Document follow-on work was submitted in January 1997.
- The Security Task was funded in May 1997 to:
 - Evaluate security features of real-time military systems.
 - Evaluate the security features of POSIX.
 - Provide an Addendum to the Delta Document with the security findings.
 - Develop an action plan to present the findings to the pertinent working groups.
- The "Delta Document Security Addendum" was delivered to NRAD in September 1997.



The Objective of the "Delta Document Security Addendum"







- Address Security Requirements for Real-Time Military Operating Systems.
- Discuss Threats to Avionics Systems encountered at all Phases of the Avionics Component's life.
- Discuss Typical Security Models.
- Assess the functionality defined by POSIX to the requirements described in the addendum document.
- Assess the functionality of the Hughes AOS to the requirements described in the addendum document.
- Document an OS Level Functional Comparison of the above Assessments.

What Are The Threats Out There






- A Threat is ... Any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to a system in the form of destruction,
 disclosure, modification or data, and/or denial of service
- Threats to Military Avionics
 - Common Threats
 - During Field Test
 - From The Training Environment
 - From The Operations Environment
 - From the Maintenance Environment
- Attacks
- Threats to Real-Time Embedded Systems



Partitioning the Security Requirements





Abstractions:

- Operating System Level ...contains all of the primitive services and functionality used to support security access and enforcement
- Policy Level ... addresses the rules used to enforce security.
- Enforcement Level ... contains the high level mechanisms that apply the security policy.



Configurations:

- Centralized Security Levels.
- Distributed Security Levels.
- Dual Application Program Interfaces (APIs).



Let us Look at the Requirements





- Operating-System-Level Requirements.
 - Low-Level Functionality.
 - Control Address Space.
 - Restrict System Object Access.
 - Support Time-Critical and Non Time-Critical Services.
 - Limit the Dynamic Allocation of Resources by a Subject.
 - Support Mechanisms to Unambiguously pair Security Labels to a Subject or an Object.



Let us Look at the Requirements





Policy-Level Requirements.

- Define the Security Rules for all Modes and Configurations of the System.
- Define Security Rules for Objects that may be Imported or Exported.
- Define Rules Restricting Subject accesses of Objects based on Sensitivity, Compartment, and Access Mode.
- Define Access Modes.
- Define Sensitivity Levels.
- Define Compartment Levels.

Let us Look at the Requirements



• Enforcement-Level Requirements.




- Provide and Protect Audit Logs.
- Log Transactions.
- Assign System-Wide Security Labels.
- Protect Security Labels.
- Restrict the change of Security Levels to Owners of the Objects.
- Deny any Requests that Violate the Security Policy.
- Bind All Subject Requests to Objects.
- Authenticate and Verify Subject Requests using the Security Policy.
- Detect and Log Violations.
- Deactivate an Offending Subject to prevent further Violations.



Centralized Security Levels








Distributed Security Levels








Dual APIs







"Security for Real-Timje Military Systems Addendum to the Delta Document" Summary





- Addendum Report is Available from Curtis Royster (DISA).
- 32 Functional Requirements were Identified and Documented.
- Hughes AOS Results
 - Met 28 of the 32 Requirements (88%).
- POSIX Results
 - Met 14 of the 32 Requirements (44%).
- Not all Requirements are Necessary for All User Environments.
 - Dependent on Implementation and Overall Weapon System Structures.



FY98 Summary



- Security Requirement Document for Standardization
 - Identification of RT Embedded Open System Security Requirements is a major accomplishment.
- Linwood Sutton (NRAD) has Retired.
- There is a Visible Void of Government System Security Advocate Participation at Industry Meetings.
- POSIX Security Working Group was Temporarily Dissolved.
- Planning for Future Resources and Activities are in Process
- New IEEE POSIX PAR Submittal, Security W/G Activity could Participate in Subgroup (Sponsorship Reqd).



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